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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA
WOLSEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants

Case No. 930049-CA

vs.
:

Oral Argument
Priority 16

INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment.1 Jurisdiction was
conferred

on

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

by

Utah

Code

Ann. §

78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1992) . The case was poured over to this Court,
which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(k) (Supp.
1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

May a district court dismiss with prejudice a state claim

preempted by ERISA?

This presents a legal question, which is

reviewed for correctness. Robertson v. Gem Insurance Co., 828 P.2d
496, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
2.

Did the district court err in granting summary judgment

on an issue first raised in a reply memorandum and which involved
disputed factual issues? "When reviewing an order granting summary
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
x

The judgment disposed of the case against the only party which
had entered an appearance in the action. An additional defendant
had been served by publication and was technically a party at the
time the notice of appeal was filed. (R. 217-215.) Plaintiffs
will file an appropriate motion to correct any deficiencies in this
Court's jurisdiction.

from the facts are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion."

Neerincrs v. State Bar, 817 P.2d 320,

320 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are nos constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances,
rules, or regulations whose interpretation is determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is a civil action to recover damages
for breach of an insurance contract.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

This matter is

a contractual dispute in which appellant T. Mark Wolsey seeks to
recover medical expenses incurred in the treatment of his daughter,
Melissa.

After

submission

of medical

bills

and

attempts

at

settlement, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on September 18,
1991.

(R. 12-1.)

Plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint on

January 14, 1992, to add an additional party defendant.

(R. 2 3-

The court granted the motion to amend on February 18, 1992.2

22.)

(R. 176-175.)
Defendant moved for summary judgment on January 22, 1992,
asserting that Plaintiffs7 sole remedy was an action in federal
court under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

2

Even though an additional defendant, Pro-Benefit Staffing,
Inc., was technically joined in the lawsuit, Pro-Benefit was not a
party to the motion for summary judgment at issue and is not a
party to this appeal. Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems will
therefore be referred to as "Defendant."
2

(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.

(R. 44-43.)

The trial court

granted the motion, and on September 9, 1992, entered a Judgment
which dismissed the entire action with prejudice. (R. 207-205.)
On September 15, 1992, Plaintiffs served a motion to amend the
judgment to provide for a dismissal without prejudice. (R. 219218.)

The motion was denied by order entered October 15, 1992.

(R. 240.)
1992.

The Wolseys filed a Notice of Appeal on November 10,

(R. 246-245.)

Statement of Facts
Mark Wolsey was insured by the defendant under Claim No.
91022883-19, Group No. 165.

(R. at 42.)

Melissa Wolsey, Mr.

Wolsey's daughter, was also covered by the policy and was injured
in an accident in Utah County on March 24, 1991.
accident rendered Ms. Wolsey a paraplegic.

(R. at 41.) The
She has incurred

extensive medical bills from the time of the accident until the
present, for which she has not received insurance compensation.
(R. at 41.)

Mr. Wolsey submitted those medical receipts to

defendant Intercare Benefit Systems for payment, but Defendant
refused to disburse funds because of a subrogation dispute. (R. at
41.) Appellants' counsel attempted to informally negotiate payment
of the medical expenses, but was unsuccessful.
breach of contract action followed.

3

(R. at 41.)

This

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Wolsey concedes the "employee benefit plan" under which he
seeks relief is an ERISA plan for purposes of preemption.

Despite

this, when ERISA preempts a state claim, the state court must
dismiss without prejudice so that a plaintiff may pursue federal
remedies. Appellee did not request dismissal with prejudice due to
ERISA preemption, nor was the trial court's dismissal proper.
The merits of the contractual dispute were not properly before
the court, since appellee failed to raise the question of contractual liability until submission of its reply memorandum in support
of its motion for summary judgment.

Further, disputed issues of

fact remain regarding Mr. Wolsey's relationship with Pro-Staffing
and whether he was entitled to benefits as a matter of contract.
No evidence of fraud is found within the record, making the court's
implicit grant of estoppel improper.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION WAS IMPROPER.
1.

Recent Utah Cases Require Plaintiffs To Concede That

Jurisdiction Was Not Proper In A State Court.
Plaintiffs argued below that the "employee plan" under which
they claimed benefits did not meet the ERISA definition of a plan,
and as a result, their claims could be heard in state court.
4

A

recent Utah case, Demond v. FHP, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (Ct. App.
Mar. 8, 1993), when read in conjunction with Robertson v. Gem
Insurance Co. , 828 P.2d

496

(Utah Ct. App.

1992),

requires

defendants to concede that this record shows Pro-Benefit Staffing
to have exercised sufficient control over its employee plan to
place that plan within the bounds of federal ERISA protection.
Plaintiffs therefore withdraw their objection to ERISA preemption
of their claim.
2.

The Trial Court Had No Jurisdiction To Dismiss Plain-

tiff s' Claims With Prejudice.
Even though jurisdiction was improper, the trial court erred
in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.

The pivotal

defect in the court's reasoning lies in the remedy it awards. The
court simply cannot dismiss with prejudice a claim which is
preempted by ERISA under any circumstances—even if Mr. Wolsey had
been guilty of the most heinous fraud imaginable (which he most
emphatically disputes).

At the point at which a state court

determines that ERISA preempts a state claim, that court no longer
has jurisdiction other than the minimum necessary to direct the
dismissal of the claim without prejudice.
Defendant's counsel conceded this point at oral argument:
But if he's going to retreat from that position then he has to say: Yeah, I'm entitled
to benefits under that plan, and maybe I am an
employee under that plan. And if he is, then
ERISA applies and ERISA preemption, and the
case should be dismissed by this court and Mr.
Wolsey can look at whatever remedies he has in
the federal court.

5

(R. at 257) (emphasis supplied).
tiffs 7

argument concerning

Only when referring to Plain-

contractual

request dismissal with prejudice.

liability did

Defendant

"But I submit if your honor

dismissed it on the first ground [the contractual argument], that
would be a dismissal with prejudice."

(R. at 257.)

Nowhere does

Defendant argue that a state court can dismiss an ERISA claim with
prejudice.
Rather,

That is clearly not the intent of the ERISA statute.

federal

courts

seek

to

develop

substantive

law

which

provides uniform protection for business relationships governed by
ERISA.

Robertson, 828 P. 2d at 499.

The goal of extending uniform

protections, safeguards and remedies to employees would not be
furthered if state courts blocked access to federal courts by means
of prejudicial dismissals. The district court's decision should be
reversed, and Plaintiffs allowed to pursue their claims and avail
themselves of federal ERISA protection in federal court.
POINT II
THE COURT'S ALTERNATIVE HOLDING THAT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED ON CONTRACTUAL
GROUNDS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
The trial court based its decision on alternative grounds.
The first alternative, addressed above, held that ERISA preemption
applied and the court lacked jurisdiction.

This Point concerns the

second alternative, which held Plaintiffs were not entitled to
benefits as a matter of contract.

Summary judgment on this issue

was improper, and the matter should be remanded for trial.

6

As argued above, this point is moot if the Court agrees with
Plaintiffs' concession that the state courts lack jurisdiction.
1.

The Issue Of Whether Plaintiffs Was Entitled To Benefits

As A Matter Of Contract Was Not Properly Before The Court.
The question of whether the Wolseys could recover under the
contract was not properly raised before the trial court.
ant's initial motion

for summary

judgment asserted

Defendonly one

argument, that "ERISA law preempts all claims asserted by the
Wolseys in their Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint."

(R. at

44.) Defendant attempted to raise the contract issue in its reply
memorandum.

(R. 185-177.) Plaintiffs objected to the new issue at

oral arguments by asserting that the only issue properly before the
court was jurisdiction.

(R. 257, 260.)

In addition, defendant's

request that the entire case be dismissed with prejudice was not
made until oral arguments. (R. 257.)
A reply memorandum, by its very label, is designed solely for
replying to arguments raised in an opposing memorandum, not for
raising new issues or claims. Claims raised for the first time in
a reply memorandum should not be considered. White v. Kent Medical
Center, Inc., P.S., 810 P.2d 4, 8 (1991). The trial court erred by
granting summary judgment on an issue raised first in a reply
memorandum.
2.

A Material Issue Of Fact Exists As To Whether Plaintiff

Was An Employee Entitled To Benefits Under The Contract.
Summary judgment is a procedural tool available when no
material facts exist, and a court is justified in rendering a
7

decision as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

However, a

single assertion of fact under oath is sufficient to overcome a
motion for summary judgment, because ". . . b y definition, summary
judgments do not resolve factual issues . . . ."

DeBry v. Salt

Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ; see also Arnica
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) ("one sworn statement under oath is all that is necessary to
create a factual issue, thereby precluding the entry of summary
judgment").

In determining whether to grant a motion under Rule

56, "[d]oubt as to whether a nonmovant has established a genuine
issue of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting
the party to go to trial."

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107

(Utah 1992) (citing Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133
(Utah 1978)).
Appeals courts use this same standard in reviewing, essentially de

novo, a

lower

court's

grant

of

summary

judgment.

In

addition, a strong requirement exists that the reviewing court
consider all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Baldwin v. Burton, 2 07 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4

(Feb. 19,

1993).
The district court stated in the alternative that if plaintiff
was not an employee, he would not be entitled to benefits as a
matter of contract. (R. at 212.)
able.

That supposition is not support-

Mr. Wolsey , s affidavit states:
1.
I have been self employed as a
certified public accountant since 1973.
I
entered into an agreement (attached hereto as
8

Exhibit "A") with Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc.
("Pro-Benefit") in January of 1987,
2.
My status as self-employed did not
change in any way pursuant to the agreement
with Pro-Benefit. . . .
(R. 158-157.)

He thus indicated his personal belief that the

contract was a legal device by which he could pay Intercare and
Pro-Benefit a fee and receive employee and accounting benefits in
return.

In direct contradiction, the Affidavit of James M.

Beardall states:
6.
One of the plaintiffs, Mark Wolsey,
was an employee of Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc.,
and was covered by the employee welfare benefit plan.
(R. 108.)

Mr. Beardall felt Mr. Wolsey was an employee, and that

he was entitled to benefits under the benefit plan.
While the positions in the two affidavits are somewhat ironic
in that they each assert facts the court would expect from the
opposing

party, the

affidavits

and

the

relevant

contractual

documents create a factual conflict which cannot be resolved by
summary judgment.

They differ as to what the term "employee"

means, what the legal relationship between the parties was meant to
encompass, and whether benefits were intended to be paid.
trial court acknowledged this conflict by stating:

The

"If the

documents upon which plaintiff bases his claims are accurate, then
plaintiff was in fact an employee of Pro-Benefit . . . ."
201.)

(R. at

In the court,s view, the contract indicated that Mr. Wolsey

was legally an employee, notwithstanding his personal belief that
he had autonomy to do as he pleased.
9

This statement by the court

on the face of its own ruling clearly indicates that summary
judgment on the question was improper, for the court itself
indicated that a question of material fact exists. This being the
case, the issue must be remanded for trial.
3.

Plaintiffs Are Not Estopped From Bringing Their Action.

The district court also indicated in its decision "[if Mr.
Wolsey were not a legal employee of Pro-Benefit] . . . plaintiff
would certainly have been a party to a sham or fraud which would
preclude any recovery." (R. 206.)

This assumption is unsupported

by any significant fact on record.
"Employee" is a legal term of art which describes a relationship between two persons or entities.

Legally and contractually

speaking, the agreement between Pro-Benefit and Mr. Wolsey was
specifically written to make Mr. Wolsey eligible for benefits under
the service agreement.

For convenience sake, he was termed an

"employee," since Pro-Benefit used that device to structure its
benefit plans.

From a personal standpoint, Mr. Wolsey did not

consider himself an employee, because he remained autonomous in his
business dealings.

He accepted the term in the contract as a

relationship through which he would pay a fee to Pro-Benefit and
Defendant to administer a benefit plan for his employees.
Nothing

in the record

(other

than

counsel's

arguments)

indicates any fraud on Mr. Wolsey's part. It is apparent from the
Affidavit of James M. Beardall that Defendant was fully aware of
the nature of the relationship between Pro-Benefit and Mr. Wolsey.
(R. at 107-109.) There was no evidence of any attempt at deceit or
10

concealment of any kind.

Consequently, summary judgment against

Plaintiff on this issue was reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in dismissing with prejudice a state
claim preempted

by ERISA.

Any dismissal

should

be without

prejudice. The court further erred in granting summary judgment in
the presence of disputed issues of fact.

The decision should be

reversed and this Court should direct entry of a dismissal without
prejudice.
DATED this

Z ^^

day of March, 1993 v

LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
^
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 29th
day of March, 1993.
Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Strong & Hanni
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

s:wolsey.brf
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4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

UT;:I "-ou::n

JmZ't IZwPH'ffi
Robert A, Burton, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
and
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123
800 Mclntyre Building
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA
WOLSEY,
Plaintiffs,

]
]
> AFFIDAVIT OF
]I JAMES M. BEARDALL

vs.
Civil No. 910400630

INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS,
Defendant.
STATE OF COLORADO

)

COUNTY OF /fofipg/tSt*

>

]

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

I, JAMES M. BEARDALL, being first duly sworn, depose and say
as follows:
1.

I am an adult in years and am competent to make this

affidavit.
2.
102577bc
2757.475

I am the president of Intercare Benefit Systems.

3.

On or about February 22, 1990 Intercare Benefit Systems

entered into an agreement with Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. to serve
as the contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit Staffing Inc.'s
employee medical benefit plan.

A copy of the claims processing

service agreement between Intercare Benefit System and Pro-Benefit
Staffing, Inc. is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4.

At

all

relevant

times

Pro-Benefit

Staffing,

Inc.

maintained a self-funded employee welfare benefit plan to provide
medical benefits to its employees.

A copy of the Summary Plan

Description of the Pro-Benefit's medical benefit plan is attached
hereto as Exhibit B.
5.

The self-funded medical benefit plan is a welfare plan as

defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
6.

One of the plaintiffs, Mark Wolsey, was an employee of

Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc., and was covered by the employee welfare
benefit plan.
7.

Plaintiffs herein were not employees of Intercare Benefit

Systems.
8.

Plaintiffs were not in any way associated with Intercare

Benefit Systems.
9.

There has not been nor is there a contract between

plaintiffs and Intercare Benefit Systems.

102577bc
2757.475

2

10.

Intercare Benefit Systems Inc. is not at the present time

nor has it ever been an insurance company.
11.

Intercare Benefit Systems does not at the present time

insure the plaintiffs, nor has Intercare Benefit Systems at any
time insured the plaintiffs.
12.
Inc.,

As contract claims processor for Pro-Benefit Staffing,

Intercare Benefit Systems was subject to the directions of

the administrator of the welfare benefit plan.
13.

Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. was the administrator of the

welfare benefit plan.
14.

Intercare Benefit Systems followed the directions of the

plan administrator in paying claims under the plan.
Further Affiant saith not.

td^l^S^^
JAMES\M. BEARDALL
me this
Subscribed and sworn to be-for-e-me
1992.

NOTARX/Ftl
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

102577bc
2757.475

3

Q~^~^ day of January,

4 ™ DISTRICT OO'J.TT
STATE <:>' ' ! T,M!

FEB 12 lOssJi'SZ

JACKSON HOWARD (1548) and
DANIELLE M. FERRON (5605), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA
WOLSEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF T. MARK
WOLSEY

Plaintiffs,
vs.

INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS,
Case No. 910400630
Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH )
T. Mark Wolsey, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I have been self employed as a certified public accountant since 1973. I

entered into an agreement (attached hereto as Exhibit "A") with Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc.
("Pro-Benefit") in January of 1987.

170

2.

My status as self-employed did not change in any way pursuant to the

agreement with Pro-Benefit. The operation and management of my business was not modified
in any way as a result of the agreement with Pro-Benefit. My relationship with my clients was
not modified in any way. I continued to collect the fees for my services rendered to my clients.
3.

I did not provide services to Pro-Benefit.

4.

Pro-Benefit did not direct my work or supervise me or my work in any way.

5.

Pursuant to the agreement with Pro-Benefit, I wrote semi-monthly checks in

an amount which included the amount of my salary to Pro-Benefit for which Pro-Benefit in turn
issued a check back in the amount of my salary after deducting taxes, fees for their services,
and premium payments for my medical insurance received. This process was required by ProBenefit for Pro-Benefit's purpose of trying to appear to be my employer.

DATED this J±_

day of February, 1992.

^%UJA)X,
T. MARK WOLSEY
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this

f(

day of February, 1992.

Notary Public
JUUEANNHEEUS
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 8460i
My Commission Expires <
May 1 a 193*
<
State oJ Utv,
\

DEC

^ '91 16:23

FRC

PAGE.QQ2

d01-373-0695

PRO-BENEFIT STAFFING INC.
CLIENT SERVICE AGREEMENT
H I S AGREEMENT made this
day of
, 198
between
RO-BENEFXT STAFFING INC* a Utah corporation hereinafter
Weired to as PRO-STAFF, with principal offices at 262 East 3900
South, Suite #114, Salt Like City, Utah $4107, (801)266*6633 and
T . MARK WOLSEY GFA,

, CUENT, of
provides as follows:

1.
STAFFING
PRO-STAFF hereby agrees to furnish Client, and Client hereby agrees
to engage from PRO-STAFF, staffing for ail the Job Function Positions
listed in the Confidential Data Summary, attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference, upon the terms and conditions
contained herein.
1
BENEFITS
PRO-STAFF shall furnish Client the benefits listed in its Description of
Benefits, a copy of which is attached hereto, and the provisions of
which are incorporated herein by reference thereto,
3.
TERM OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall remain in force for the tern specified in the
Cient Service Application, atached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference (the Initial Tern). Following the Initial Term,: this
Agreement shall remain in force from month to month (the Extended
Tern), Client may terminate this Agreement by giving thirty (3.0) days
wnaen notice to PRO-STAFF at any time daring the term of this
Agreement, During the Initial Term, PRO-STAFF may terminate this
Agreement should Client materially breach any of the provisions of this
Agreement or by written agreement of both parties. During the
Extended Term, PRO-STAFF nay terminate this Agreement by giving
thirty (30) days written notice of such termination to GienL
."*" SERVICE FEES
;) Clieni shall pay PRO-STAFF a service fee equal to the fee w e
percentage specified in the Client Service Application multiplied by the
gross earnings of PRO-STAFF employees filling Job Function
Positions for the Clieni
(b) During the Initial Term of this Agreement, PRO-CTAFF may not
adjust the fee rate percentage except for increases in insurance
premiums, statutory increases in empioyioent taxes, changes in rates of
pay, or any changes in the Job Function Positions required by Client*
During the Extended Term of this Agreement, PRC-STAFF may adjust
the fee rate percentage for increases in insurance premiums, statutory
increases in employment taxes, changes in rates of pay, or any changes
in the Job Function Positions required by Client or upon thirty (30)
days written notice thereof.
(c)
Any increase in the fee rate percentage for increases in insurance
premiums, statutory increases in employment taxes, changes in rates of
payr cr any changes in the Job Function positions shall be effective on
the date of such increases or changes.
(d) Services Conditioned upon payment* The services agreed to be
provided by PRO-STAFF are conditioned upon prompt and immediate
payment by Client. In the event Client fails to pay any amounts due
promptly and immediately, PRO-STAFF may, at its sole discretion,
either suspend or terminate its services under this Agreement with or
without notice to Client, in such event, any and all staffed employees
of PRO-STAFF shall automatically become U» employees of Client
and shall be treated as such in all respects by die parties.
(e) Client shall pay PRO-STAFF all service fees due in guaranteed
funds no later than the day precseding the first day of the pay period to
which such service fees apply.
(0 Client agrees to verify ail time submissions of PRO-STAFF
employees.
(g) If Client believes that any billing ar other communication
Nitweec the parlies is in error, Client shall immediately notify PRO
'AFF.
a.
SALARY AND WAGE RATE ADJUSTMENTS
Client agrees to participate in the periodic evaluation of PRO
STAFF employees. PRO-STAFF will use these evaluations and Cient
reconffiencauons to determine salary and wage rate adjustments.

6.

SET-UP FEE

Client agrees to pay PRO-STAFF a non-refundable one-time setup fee in the amount specified in the Client Service Application.
7.
INSURANCE
(a) PRO-STAFF shall furnish and keep in fall force and effect at all
times during the term of this Agreement,, workers compensation
insurance covering all PRO-STAFF employees filling Job Function
Positions under the terms of this Agreement. PRO-STAFF shall
provide Client with evidence of this coverage.
(b) If any PROSTAFF employee Oiling a Job Function Position is to
drive a vehicle of any lend owned, unowned, hired, or leased by
Client, Client shall furnish automobile liability insurance on any
venicie affected. The. policy shall insure against public liability for
bodily injury and property damage, with a nshxmum combined single
limit of Three Hundred Thousand Doilan (S300,000.00) and uninsured
motorist or PIP or equivalent coverage of at least the minimum limits
required by the State where such "no fault" laws shall apply. Client
shall cause its insurance carrier to uame those leased employees of
FRO-STAFF as additional named insureds and issue a Certificate of
Insurance to PROSTAFF, allowing not less than thirty (30) days
advance notice of cancellation or material change.
(c) Client agrees to cause its insurance carrier to name PROSTAFF
as an additional named insured on Client's general liability insurance
policy and shall issue a Certificate of Insurance to PROSTAFF,
allowing not less than thirty (30) days advance notice of cancellation or
material change. The minimum requirement shall be Five Hundred
Thousand Dollars (5500,000.00) combined single limit including, but
not
limited
to.
where
applicable,
premises
operations,
products/completed operations, contract and broad form property
damage, independent contractors, personal hrary, host liquor liability
and full liquor liability. Clients rendering professional services win be
further required to furnish professional liability coverage as applicable.
(Depending on the business activities of the client, the minimum limits
of coverage mayrequireSLOOO.000.00)
(d) Each party herein, hereby waives any claim in its favor against
the other by way of subrogation or indemnification which may arise
during the Initial or Extended Term of the Agreement for any and all
loss of or damage to any of its property or for bodily injury which bis,
damage or bodily injury is covered by insurance to the extend that such
loss or damage is recovered under such policies of insurance as
required in paragraphs 7 (a), (b) and (c), above.'
(e) Client agrees to keep in full force and effect all insurance required
under the terms of this Agreement
&
ADMINISTRATION
(a) The parties understand and agree that PRO-STAFF is an
independent contractor and all individuals assigned to Client to fill the
Job Function Positions art employees of PRO-STAFF. PROSTAFF is
thereby responsible for such administrative employment matters as
payment of all federal, state and local employment taxes, providing
woricers compensation coverage, as well as non-obligatory fringe
benefit programs for i s employees. PRO-STAFF agrees to hold Client
harmless from direct out-of-pocket expenses cf Client which may result
from PRO-STAFFs failure to withhold these taxes or failure to conduct
itself in accordance with applicable state and federal law. However.
PRO-STAFF shall not be liable in any event for Client's loss of profits,
business goodwill or other consequential, special or incidental
damages.
(b) PROSTAFF siall have the primary responsibility for hiring,
training, evaluating, replacing, supervising, disciplining and firing of
individuals assigned to fill Client's Job Function Positions.
9.
SUPERVISION
(a) PRO-STAFF snail designate an on-site supervisor for client who
shall determine ihe procedures to be followed by PRO-STAFF
employees regarding the time and performance of their duties. Cient
agrees to cooperate with PRO-STAFF in the formation of such policies
and procedures and permit PROSTAFF to implement irs policies and
procedures reianng to PROSTAFF employees.
(b) Client shall make all non-rouanc dirccuves through ihc designate
PROSTAFF on-site supervisor.
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APPROVAL OF SUPPLIED STAFF
PRO-STAFF shall provide employees who are duly qualified and
skilled in the areas in which their services axe to be utilized. PROSTAFF will consult with Client in filling its Job Function Positions,
but PRO-STAFF has the right to determine which of PRO-STAFFs
employees shall be designated to fill Client's Job Function Positions.
Client has the right to reject any employee so furnished* if dissatisfied
with such employees performance. If any PRO-STAFF employee is
rejected, PRO-STAFF agrees to furnish a suitable replacement within a
reasonable tunc
1L HOLIDAY, SICK LEAVE, AND VACATION PAY
PRO-STAFF employees shall receive pad holidays, sick leave
and paid vacations, in accordance w ^ Clients'* existing policies, and
as provided by the Service Fee designated in the Client Service
Anoiication.
l T SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT AND GOVERNMENT
COMPLIANCE
(a) Client agrees to comply with all EEO, health and safety laws,
regulations, ordinances, directives and rules imposed by controlling
federal state and local governments, and will immediately report ail
accidents and injuries of PRO-STAFF employees to PRO-STAFrl
(b) Client agrees to comply, at its exoense, with any specific
direcuves from PRO-STAFF, PRO^TAF^s workers condensation
easier, or any government agency having jurisdiction over the work
place, health or safety.
(c) Client shall provide or ensure use of .ail personal protective
equipment as required by federal state or local laws, regulations,
ordinances, directives or rules or as deemed necessary by PRO-STAFF
or PRO-STAFFs workers compensation carrier;
(d) PRO-CTAFF or its workers compensation earner has therightat
any scheduled mutually convenient time to inspect Clients premises
and operations, but is not obligated for such mspecrions. PRO-STAFF
or its insurers my give reports to Client on conchtons found upon such
inspections* Neither the insurer nor PRO-STAFF warrants the tcsait of
such inspections or the absence thereof, or that the operations or
premises of Client are in compliance with any laws, regulations, codes
or standards.
13. HOLD HARMLESS
Client hereby agrees to indeamify, defend and hold PRO-STAFF
harmless from and against any and all liability, expense, including
court costs and attorney fees, and claims for damage of any nature
whatsoever, whether known or unknown* as though expressly sex forth
and described herein, which P R O - S T A F F may incur, suffer, become
liable for, or which may be asserted Qr claimed against PRO-STAFF as
a result of me acts, errors or omissions of Client including without
limitation any violation or breach of p^rargraph 12 above by GienL
14. ASSIGNMENT
Neither PRO-STAFF nor Client shall assign this Agreement or its
rights and duties hereunder, or any interest herein, without ths prior
written consent of the other carry,
15. INTEGRATION
This Agreement consulates the entire agreement between the
pomes with regard to this subject matter, and no other agreement,
statement, promise or practice between the parties relating to the
subject matter shall be bmding on the parties «w>e»i specifically
referred to herein and incorporated herein, by reference thereto. This
agreement may be changed only be written amendment thereto signed
bv both parties.
16. WAIVER
Failure by either party at any time to require performance by the
G&crpsRj'or &ckim& bread: cf my proraicrtr cf this Agreement will
not be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach nor affect the
effectiveness of this Agreement, nor any part thereof, nor prejudice
either party as regards to any subsequent action.
17. NOTICES
Any notice or demand 10 be given hereunder by either party shall
be effected by personal delivery i& writing or by registered wiaij,
postage prepaid, return receipt requested, and 'shall be deemed
communicated at the time of personal delivery thereof, or twenty-four
(24) hours after mailing if sent through the **»«H- All notices shall be
xtticssed to the party s principal place of business, or as set forth m
this Agreement, but each party may change the address by wnnen
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notice in accordance with ttu» paragraph.
18. ATTORNEY FEES
In the event that any action is brought by either patty hereto as a
result of a breach or default in any provision of this Agreement, the
prevailing parry in such action shall be awarded reasonable attorney
fees and costs from the other party, in addition to any other relief to
which the party may be entitled.
19. GOVERNING LAW
This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
20* PARTIAL INVAUDETY
Shouid any torn, warrant, covenant, conditon or provision of this
Agreement be held invalid or unenforceable, the balance thereof shall
remain in full force and shall stand ai if the uaonfoxceabie or invalid
part did not CJQSL

Executed &c_

$M>w LiJr
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

••'A. 9 %

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^

<f
%
%

T. MARK WOLSEY
CASE NUMBER:

Plaintiff,

910400630

RULING

vs.
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS, et al
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on
the motion of Def Intercare Benefit Systems seeking Summary
Judgment,

The Court has reviewed the file, considered the

memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon
being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1.

Said motion is granted.
If, as PI contends in his affidavit, he has never

been an employee of Def Pro-Benefit, PI would not be entitled to
benefits as a matter of contract.

Under such circumstances, PI

would certainly have been a party to a sham or fraud which should
preclude any recovery.
If the documents upon which PI bases his claims are
accurate, then PI was in fact an employee of Pro-Benefit and Pi's
claims are preempted by ERISA rules and regulations.
Dated this !J_

day of July, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

CULLEN
cc:

Danielle Ferron, Esq.
Jackson B. Howard, Esq.
Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Wesley C. Argyle, Esq.

CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

fe
Robert A. Burton, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

1

-c n

um&te£D-3L->-ML<-££

and
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3017
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA
WOLSEY,
J U D G M E N T

Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 910400630

vs.

Judge Cullen Y. Christen

INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS,
Defendant.

Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems1 motion for summary
judgment came on for hearing before the court on June 19, 1992,
at 11:00 A.M.

Plaintiff was represented by his attorneys,

Jackson B. Howard and Danielle Ferron.

Defendant Intercare

Benefit Systems was represented by its attorneys, Robert A.
Burton and Wesley C. Argyle.

The court having reviewed the

W:

file, considered memoranda of counsel, entertained argument
of counsel, and being fully advised, grants defendant
Intercare Benefit Systems1 motion and finds as follows:
If, as plaintiff contends in his affidavit, he has
never been an employee of defendant Pro-Benefit, plaintiff
would not be entitled to benefits as a matter of contract.
Under such circumstances, plaintiff would certainly have been a
party to a sham or fraud which would preclude any recovery.
If the documents upon which plaintiff bases his claim
are accurate, then plaintiff was in fact an employee of ProBenefit and plaintifffs claims are preempted by ERISA rules and
regulations.
Based upon the foregoing findings and in light of sworn
testimony given by plaintiff in his affidavit,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's amended complaint against Intercare

Benefit Systems be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Defendant Intercare Benefit Systems be and hereby

is awarded judgment in its favor and against plaintiff, T. Mark
Wolsey, no cause of action.

CULLEN Yi/ CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August, 1992,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment,
first-class postage affixed, to:
Jackson Howard
Danielle M. Ferron
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
120 East 300 North Street
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

:0.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY et al
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NUMBER:

910400630

RULING

INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS
Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501, on
the motion of PI seeking an Order amdneding Judgment. The Court
has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, no
oral argument being requested, and upon being advised in the
premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1. Said motion is denied.
Dated this 15th day of October, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

CULLEN Y^CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE
cc:

Danielle M. Ferron, Esq.
Robert A. Burton, Esq.
Wesley C. Argyle, Esq.

4TH DISTRICT C O W
STAT* ^ L'TAH

Nov 3 3
Robert A. Burton, #0516
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
and
Wesley C. Argyle, #0123
1245 Brickyard Road, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
T. MARK WOLSEY and MELISSA
WOLSEY,
Plaintiffs,
)

O R D E R

)

Civil No. 910400630

)

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

vs.
INTERCARE BENEFIT SYSTEMS,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment was considered
by the court under

Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration.

The court having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of
counsel, and being fully advised, issued a ruling dated
October 15, 1992, wherein it denied plaintiffs' motion;
accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

>4

plaintiffs1 motion to amend the judgment dated September 9,
1992, be and hereby is denied.
Dated this

^

day of QtrCUSSr, 19 92.

BY THE COURT:

l

Judge Cul

Christensen

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of October, 1992,
I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Order, first-class postage prepaid, to:
Jackson Howard and
Danielle M. Ferron
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
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